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Abstract 
The papers assembled in this special issue shed light on the question of the interrelation between 
democracy and policy evaluation by discussing research on the use of evaluations in democratic pro-
cesses. The collection makes a case for a stronger presence of evaluation in democracy beyond ex-
pert utilization. Parliamentarians prove to be more aquainted with evaluations than expected and 
the inclusion of evaluations in policy arguments increases the deliberative quality of democratic cam-
paigns. In sum, evaluation and democracy turn out to be well compatible after all. 
 
 
Introduction 
Some twenty years ago, with the arrival of New Labour in British government in 1997, the new para-
digm of “evidence-based policy“ set out to establish “a change with past administrations, in the sense 
that policy making should be pragmatic, based on what works best, rather than ideological position” 
(Campbell 2002: 89). The evidence-based policy movement was originally tailored for Western democ-
racies. However, while questions such a, “what is evidence?”, “how does evidence enter policy-mak-
ing?”, or “how is evidence to be presented for decision-makers to acknowledge it?” have been widely 
addressed in research, the core question of the compatibility of democracy and evidence has not been 
treated much beyond what original studies on technocracy found in the mid 20th century. Seminal 
thinkers such as Lindblom (1959), Wildavsky (1979) or Habermas (1968) stated the tension between 
democracy and technocracy and offered advice how to overcome the gap between science and 
politics. However, the diagnosis of the tension was of rather general nature and did not address the 
fundamental question of whether the two systems of science and democracy actually fit at all. 
The overall topic of the papers assembled in this special issue is the long term use of evaluation results 
and how they make their way into the general political discourse beyond short term and instrumental 
use. The underlying basic question is whether policy-making based on evaluation findings leads to 
purely technocratic, undemocratic decision-making or do evaluation results enrich democratic pro-
cesses? The present symposium issue sheds light on the question of the interrelation between democ-
racy and policy evaluation by discussing research on the use of evaluations in democratic processes. In 
the following, I will give a short account of the historical background of the scientific debate about the 
difficult relationship between science and politics in general and how it links to evaluation and democ-
racy in particular before providing an overview of the six contributions to the special issue and their 
core findings. 
Politics-Administration-Dichotomy, Technocracy, and the Evidence-based policy movement: a short 
history of ideas on the relationship between scientific evidence and democracy 
Considering the current debate on post-truth democracy (Harsin 2015) with the US-American presi-
dency and the electoral campaign preceding it, the Brexit referendum campaign, or the 2017 decision 
of the Hungarian government to drive its university of highest repute – the Central European University 
– out of the country as anecdotal evidence, the distant political observer feels tempted to answer the 
question of whether democracy and science go well together with a firm no. However, a glance at the 
history of political thought shows that both the problem and the debate may not be all that new as it 
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looks. It was early modern administrative thinkers who discussed the so-called politics-administration-
dichotomy (P-A Dichotomy) from both analytical and normative viewpoints. These early analyses from 
the late 19th and early 20th century discussed institutional fit and misfit between technical and political 
spheres of society more explicitely than their followers in the mid-20th century did. While Max Weber 
argued for a neutral administration implementing political will, Woodrow Wilson made the case for 
the opposite: it was not democratic politics that was threatened by an all too powerful bureaucracy, 
but a creative administration was threatened by corrupt politics (Sager and Rosser 2009). Cuff (1978: 
241) states of Wilson: “Creation, not control was the central issue; private, not public power, the chief 
threat to liberty.” Rosser and Mavrot (2016) show for the US and France how these normative and 
quite rigourous institutional ideas travelled in time and context. In post-WWII political theory, the no-
tion of a strict P-A Dichotomy was rejected in the USA in order to strengthen the input side of the 
political system and shift more weight in the balance of powers to the legislature and representative 
bureaucracy. In France, the dichotomy was rejected for the opposite reason, namely to strengthen the 
Executive branch as guardian of the general will. The understanding of the relationship between tech-
nical knowledge and democratic will, hence, was largely determined by its political system context. 
A closely related concept to the P-A Dichotomy was the technocracy movement which also made a 
transatlantic career traveling from the USA to Europe in the interwar years. Technocracy as a social 
movement was founded in the USA. William Henry Smyth (1919) coined the term to state the need to 
include engineers in the decision-making process of public administration. He claimed that the USA 
had changed its form of government in the course of World War I “by organizing and coordinating the 
Scientific knowledge, the Technical Talent, the Practical Skill and the Man Power of the entire Commu-
nity: Focusing them in the National Government, and applying the Unified National Force to the ac-
complishment of a Unified National Purpose. For this unique experiment in rationalized Industrial De-
mocracy I have coined the term ‘Technocracy’” (Smyth 1921: 13). The “industrial democracy” was in-
tended to tailor the political organisation of the wartime economy to meet the needs of peacetime. 
By the early 1930s, technocracy had become the concept of “government by technical decision mak-
ing” (Njalsson, 2005: 57), which was to be used as a means of solving contemporary social and eco-
nomic problems. This notion appealed to German authors in the 1930s who started to translate the 
respective writings into German. As Hurni (2014) finds, the USA continued to be the reference point 
for German technocrats, even after Hitler seized power. 
In post-WWII Germany, Habermas took up the term technocracy when he came up with three models 
of how the two social subsystems of science and politics work together (Sager 2007). Habermas (1968: 
120-145) developed the idea that a political system's response to the growing complexity of modern 
society can be threefold: either scientifically little informed politics dominate a professional admin-
istration, or a highly specialized and scientifically well informed administration dominates the politics, 
or, finally, both work together in a pragmatic and non-hierarchic way in order to find the best solutions 
for the social problems at stake. Habermas called the first mode decisionism, the second one technoc-
racy, and the third one pragmatism. While the first model closely followed Weber’s idea of a neutral 
administration, the second model corresponded to Wilson’s version of the P-A Dichotomy. Habermas, 
however, rejected both models and made his case for a pragmatic exchange between science and 
politics – a notion also mirrored in Svara’s (2001) concept of complementarity between politics and 
administration. 
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Habermas’ (1996) writings brought the debate about scientific evidence in politics closer to the ques-
tion of democratic discourse. This branch of research on democracy in particular was pursued by schol-
ars focusing on deliberative processes, the “unforced force of the better argument” (Allen 2012) in 
general and the use of evidence in arguments in particular such as Dryzek (1990), Chambers (2003), as 
well as Bohman & Rehg (1997). This philosophical line of thought inspired and entered different, mostly 
post-positivist approaches of policy analysis including scholars such as Majone (1989), Fischer (2009) 
or Saretzki (2012) arguing that policy analysis needs to provide arguments for democratic decision-
making processes. 
With the rise of policy evaluation as an increasingly rigid way of providing policy-specific evidence from 
the 1970s on, the discourse on the relationship between science and democracy found a concrete 
center of gravity to refer to (Weiss 1998; Weiss and Bucuvalas 1980). While the literature on evaluation 
use focused on the one dependent variable of use and took a mainly analytical stance to explain it, the 
evidence-based policy literature was part of an actual political movement and thus had a much more 
normative claim. The evidence-based policy movement mainly drew from a growing body of policy-
knowledge gained from policy analysis and transferred them into concrete ideas on how policies 
should be designed (cf. Mavrot & Sager 2016). Consequently, evaluative evidence was expected to 
make policies more coherent: addressing the right target groups, increasing the efficiency of their im-
plementation and increasing their effectiveness. The core questions underlying such rhetoric were pri-
marily of instrumental nature: What is evidence and when, how, where and by whom should it be 
enrolled into policy-making processes? These basic tenets have been addressed by a vast bulk of liter-
ature such as Frey and Ledermann (2010), Nutley et al. (2003), Simons (2004), or Pawson (2006) to 
name just a very few. 
At the same time and not least due to the normative side of the evidence-based policy movement, 
critics have argued that the evidence movement could lead to purely technocratic, undemocratic de-
cision-making. Others retort to this criticism that evaluation results can enrich the political debate and 
challenge ideological and interest-based views and thus improve the quality of the discourse in political 
processes (e.g. Frey 2012; Howlett 2009). Yet another set of scholars argue that evaluations (and policy 
analysis more generally) need not only to provide knowledge and information to decision makers, but 
more importantly offer a basis for their arguments (Fischer & Forester 1993; Fischer & Gottweis 2012; 
Majone 1989). Evaluation is seen as a process rather than a mere service activity and the interest is in 
the filters evaluation results pass on their way into democratic decision-making. Associated with this 
literature is the tradition of evaluation research that deals with questions of valuing and the treatment 
of values in the evaluation process (Christie and Alkin 2013, 31; House & Howe 2003), as well as the 
literature on evaluation theory and practice focusing on participative and deliberative evaluation in-
cluding Patton (1997, 2002), Valovirta (2002) or House and Howe (1999, 2003).  
These literatures put the question of democratic quality of evidence-based policy and evaluation at 
center stage. Widmer (2009) criticizes proponents of evidence-based policy-making for claiming that 
such practices contribute to state legitimacy. He argues that the linkages between evidence-based 
policy-making and the output-oriented legitimacy of the state only partly have the potential to con-
tribute to output legitimacy whereas many restrictions remain. Accordingly, two points of discussion 
prevail: first, how is scientific evidence best integrated in democratic processes and second, how are 
evaluations ideally carried out to provide a basis for their use in democratic processes? Widmer’s 
(2009) critique illustrates that the debate on the relationship between democracy and evaluation has 
not been settled yet. While we know a lot about how evidence is used in administrative and technical 
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policy-making there still is little research on the democratic use of evaluation results in political pro-
cesses. There is great need for findings on this neglected strand of research because it creates a differ-
ent logic for drawing on knowledge than the instrumental logic used in the research on improvement 
of policy measures. In addition to this, the topic brings together two fields of political science, namely 
research on democracy and research on evaluation in taking the perspective of one field in order to 
look at the other field. This offers a broad platform to discuss various contexts and links and thus en-
riches knowledge in both fields. The papers assembled in this special issue contribute to this debate. 
They will be presented in the following section with a special focus on how they advance knowledge 
as to the relationship of evaluation and democracy.  
Structure, content and core findings of the collection 
Representation in parliament and direct citizen participation by direct-democratic vote are two core 
institutions of democratic systems (Sager and Bühlmann 2009; Sager, Ingold & Balthasar 2017). Rep-
resentative democracy is more widely established in the Western world than direct democracy which 
is less widespread and takes on different degrees of binding decisions. While non-binding plebiscites 
are used widely but on an ad hoc basis, binding referendums are only found in a very limited number 
of countries, most prominently in Switzerland with its semi-direct democracy. Given its high evaluation 
activity, Switzerland therefore is a good venue to study the relationship between evaluation and de-
mocracy. Four of the six papers of this collection (Bundi 2017a; Eberli 2017; Schlaufer 2017; Stucki 
2017) stem from a large research project studying the role of evaluations in the Swiss political system, 
the Syneval-project (cf. Sager, Widmer & Balthasar 2017). The present papers, however, do not focus 
on the Swiss system as such but use it as a case to study specific questions of basic democratic interest 
regarding the two democratic institutions of representative and direct democracy. Two papers com-
plement the collection (Marra 2017, Pleger and Sager 2017) by focussing on additional aspects of trans-
parency by indicators and political pressure on evaluations in democracy. 
Bundi (2017a) focuses on the politics behind legislative requests for evaluations. Evaluations are an 
important instrument for parliaments. Evaluations can provide parliamentarians with useful infor-
mation for legislation (Weiss, 1989) or they help parliaments to fulfill their oversight function towards 
governments (Bundi 2017b; Pelizzo and Stapenhurst, 2012). However, research suggests that members 
of parliament prefer evaluations, which confirm their own opinions (Whiteman 1985). Although par-
liamentarians have demanded more evaluations in the last couple of years (Speer, Pattyn and De Peu-
ter, 2015), the motivation behind parliamentary evaluations still remains unclear (Bundi 2016). Schol-
arship so far has neglected the parliament as a commissioner of evaluations although parliamentarians 
are important stakeholders of evaluations. Extant literature fails to explain what goal a member of 
parliament pursues when he or she demands an evaluation. Bundi (2017a) considers the question of 
which strategic intention members of parliament have when they demand an evaluation with a parlia-
mentary request. Bundi (2017a) provides important new insights into the parliamentarians’ motiva-
tions to pursue an evaluation. Members of legislative committees submit parliamentary requests to 
oppose a policy, while members of oversight committees submit parliamentary requests to obtain in-
formation on specific policies.1 Party membership of the responsible member of the Federal Govern-
ment does not influence the parliamentarians’ strategy. The parliamentarians thus employ evaluations 
                                                          
1 These findings are complemented by Eberli and Bundi’s (2017: 260) evidence about what policies were af-
fected: most evaluations were demanded for land-use and infrastructure policies, followed by education, public 
finances and health. These are the fields with the highest evaluation activity in Switzerland. Less evaluations 
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as an instrument for different goals depending on their legislative role. However, what the study finds 
unanimously among all members of parliament is that the main instrument is to request evaluations 
rather than to use their actual findings for decision-making. 
Eberli (2017) looks at exactly this use of evaluations in Parliaments and investigates the influence of 
evaluations in the legislative process. In the very political arena of the parliament, it is assumed that 
evaluations are used as a political resource, e.g. to support the argumentation or to legitimize a deci-
sion, rather than as a means to make sound decisions. However, previous research has paid little at-
tention to the use of evaluations in the parliamentary legislative process, which not only entails the 
(public) plenary debate, but also the work in the (non-public) committees that is central for gaining 
expertise and making informed decisions. The analysis of four case studies in two Swiss cantonal par-
liaments partly confirms these assumptions. While evaluations were used more often to bolster the 
argumentation in the cases with a high level of conflict, the observed differences between the cases 
do not correspond to the assumptions concerning the committee systems. Eberli (2017) finds an ex-
planation in that the relationship between the administration and the committee differs for standing 
and ad-hoc committees. The study further shows that evaluations are rarely used in most cases. Par-
liamentarians used more general background knowledge than knowledge from evaluations. The find-
ings from the evaluations likewise had little influence on the policies' content. Nevertheless, those 
parliamentarians who used evaluations seemed to attribute more importance to them and considered 
them as influential. Eberli’s (2017) study therefore corroborates that evaluations have little impact on 
parliamentary politics although the parliamentarians seem to appreciate evaluations as a robust foun-
dation for policy-making.  
Stucki (2017) leaves the parliamentary arena behind and moves on to the use of evaluation results in 
direct democratic decision-making beyond expert utilization. In spite of the the vast amount of litera-
ture on how scientific evidence is used by the political-administrative nexus, the question of what pol-
icy analysis and evaluation actually have to offer for the direct-democratic decision-making by ordinary 
citizens remains a blind spot in research to this day. The author asks for what kind of direct-democratic 
arguments evaluations are used in campaigns. Rather than a positivist approach to policy analysis 
where findings are considered objective truths that can be used as ready-made recommendations, 
Stucki (2017) employs a constructivist approach where evaluation results are arguments that contrib-
ute to a political discourse that is not necessarily rational. She argues that this view of policy evaluation 
results is appropriate for the study of direct-democratic decision-making as voters neither are policy 
experts nor do they share a uniform belief in scientific rationality. Stucki (2017) studies 16 campaigns 
on smoking bans that took place between 2005 and 2012 in the German part of Switzerland. The main 
conflict line in debates on smoking bans is drawn between individual freedom and public health (Stucki 
2016a,b). The study shows that not many of the arguments found in the campaigns refer to evidence. 
Evaluation results are mostly cited in support of causal arguments referring to the effects of policy 
interventions. Policy information primarily is available for causal arguments. It is known in the public 
discourse but only cited explicitly when the speaker wants to raise credibility. This especially applies 
to researchers, such as evaluators. However, the results also show that the political use of evaluation 
results fosters an informed discourse and the evidence may eventually become common public 
knowledge. The credentials of evaluators make them suitable not only for bringing more evaluation 
                                                          
were requested for the policy sectors of energy, security, foreign affairs, and migration. Preferences for policy 
sectors to be evaluated differ between political parties, though. 
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results into the direct-democratic discourse but also for acting as teachers in this discourse. In cam-
paigns on smoking bans, arguments with and without evidence from both, the pro and the con sides, 
are presented to the voters, which provides for unbiased decision-making. However, a higher level of 
explicit references to evidence might enhance quality of the discourse during direct-democratic cam-
paigns in enabling voters to disentangle assertions form substantiating explanations. 
Schlaufer (2017) follows up the finding that evaluation fosters informed democratic discourse and 
studies the impact evaluation use has on the discourse during direct democratic campaigns. Evaluation 
results may be used in policy debates to support arguments. There is a frequent expectation in the 
literature on the political use of evaluations that such an evidence-based perspective may lead to more 
reasoned debates and, hence, contribute to a high quality discourse. According to deliberative demo-
cratic theory, deliberation displays high discourse quality when there are high levels of reason-giving, 
respect, inclusiveness and reciprocity. Schlaufer (2017) employs indicators from the Discourse Quality 
Index (DQI) and political communication research to formulate hypotheses as to the impact of evi-
dence integration on the discourse quality of media content in the case of school policy (cf. Schlaufer 
2016a,b). She presents a direct on-off comparison of comparable newspaper items. In total, the author 
compares 63 articles with reference to evaluations to 63 articles without reference to evaluations. The 
results of the quantitative analysis is backed with qualitative evidence in the form of newspaper 
quotes. Schlaufer (2017) can show that those newspaper articles containing evaluations exhibit higher 
levels of justification, reciprocity and respect, tend to argue in terms of the common good, and contain 
less storytelling than newspaper articles that do not refer to evaluations. Both the quantitative and 
qualitative analyses suggest that the inclusion of evidence contributes to discourse quality in direct-
democratic campaigns. 
While the papers on legislative and direct-democratic use of evaluations, thus, draw a somewhat am-
biguous picture of the influence of evaluations in democracy, the evidence-based policy literature 
makes a strong case for the political role of scientific evidence gained from evaluations. The political 
relevance of evaluation studies is mirrored by the fact that evaluators are repeatedly put under pres-
sure to deliver results in line with given expectations as reported in different studies (Pleger & Sager, 
2016; Morris & Clark, 2013; Stockmann, Meyer, & Schenke, 2011; The LSE GV314 Group, 2013). Pleger 
and Sager (2017) take this observation as a starting point to discuss political influence on evaluators to 
misrepresent findings and to conceptualize a finer grained model of influence on evaluations in de-
mocracy. Evaluations can only serve as neutral evidence-base for policy decision-making as long as 
they have not been altered along non-scientific criteria such as party political ideology or administra-
tive self-interest. A conceptual challenge is the fact that pressure cannot only be negative, but also 
constructive. Based on a survey among Swiss evaluators, the authors develop a heuristic model of 
influence on evaluations that does justice to this ambivalence of influence: the BUSD-model (Better-
ment, Undermining, Support, and Distortion). The model is based on the distinction of two dimensions 
of explicitness of pressure and direction of influence. Pleger and Sager (2017) illustrate the model with 
concrete findings and show how it can be applied to understand pressure and protect evaluators and 
evaluation culture. 
Finally, democratic claims such as transparency and accountability are not just a feature of political 
systems as wholes but also have entered the way public organizations are managed. A core problem 
of outcome-oriented steering is the choice of adequate indicators (Ritz and Sager 2010; Sager et al. 
2010) and the resulting gaming strategies of the once governed. Marra (2017) takes Italy’s administra-
tive reforms of the past two decades to study political consequences of performance measurement 
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and evaluation regimes within public organizations. Evaluation was institutionalized to improve pro-
gram effectiveness, staff productivity, and results-driven accountability. Marra (2017) finds various 
ambiguities within Italian public administration when formal compliance to sandard procedures is 
countered by a lack of cross-agency coordination and fragmented evaluation community. The author 
sees a need for greater integration between program evaluation and performance measurement to 
foster organizational learning and democratic accountability at the different levels of government. This 
final contribution shifts the attention to a consolidated evaluation culture as a necessary condition for 
evaluation to make a constructive contribution to democratic decision-making. 
Conclusion 
In sum, the present collection makes a case for a stronger presence in democracy beyond expert utili-
zation. Parliamentarians prove to be more aquainted with evaluations than expected and the inclusion 
of evaluations in policy arguments increases the deliberative quality of democratic campaigns. How-
ever, the presented research also shows that evaluations are not enough present in these campaigns 
and that members of parliament request evaluations rather than read them. In order to provide both 
policy-relevant and neutral information for democratic decision-making, the relation between sender 
and receiver of this information needs to be recalibrated. This calibration entails the need for a sensi-
tive handling of different forms of influence and pressure on evaluators just as well as stronger con-
gruence between performance measurent and evaluation and a consolidated evaluation culture across 
evaluators and public administration. Within these parameters, however, evaluation and democracy 
may turn out to be well compatible after all. 
 
Author information 
Fritz Sager, PhD, is a professor of political science at the KPM Center for Public Management at the 
University of Bern. He is specialized in administrative studies and theory, policy research and evalua-
tion, organizational analysis, and Swiss politics.  
His research has been published in the European Journal of Political Research, European Political Sci-
ence Review, Governance, Policy Sciences, Public Administration Review, Policy Studies Journal, Public 
Administration, Journal of Public Policy, Policy & Politics, Political Studies, West European Politics, the 
Journal of Urban Affairs, the American Journal of Evaluation, Public Management Review, Public 
Money & Management, Evaluation, and the Swiss Political Science Review among others. He won the 
Marshall E. Dimock Award for the best lead article in the Public Administration Review during the vol-
ume year 2009 the Highly Commended Paper Award at the Literati Network Awards for Excellence in 
2013, the Prix SEVAL 2015 awarded by the Swiss Evaluation Society and the IPSA 2016 Best Compara-
tive Policy Paper Award in 2017. 
  
9 
 
 
References 
Allen, A. (2012), The Unforced Force of the Better Argument: Reason and Power in Habermas’ Politi-
cal Theory. Constellations, 19: 353–368.  
Bohman, James & Rehg, William eds. (1997). Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics. 
MIT Press: Cambridge, Mass./London. 
Bundi, P. (2016). What do we know about the demand for evaluations? Insights from the parliamen-
tary arena. American Journal of Evaluation, 37(4), 522–541. 
Bundi, P. (2017a). Parliamentarians’ strategies for policy evaluations. Evaluation and Program Plan-
ning, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.evalprogplan.2017.02.003  
Bundi P. (2017b). Varieties of accountability: How attributes of policy fields shape parliamentary 
oversight. Governance. Early online. https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12282 
Chambers, Simone. (2003). Deliberative democratic theory. Annual review of political science, 6(1), 
307-326.  
Christie, Christina A., & Marvin C. Alkin. (2013). “An evaluation theory tree.” In Evaluation roots. A 
wider perspective of theorists’ views and influences, ed. Marvin C. Alkin (pp. 11-58). Thousand Oaks, 
CA: Sage. 
Cuff, Robert D. (1978). “Wilson and Weber: Bourgeois Critics in an Organized Age”, Public Administra-
tion Review 38: 240-244. 
Dryzek, John S. (1990). Discursive democracy: Politics, policy, and political science: Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press. 
Eberli D. (2017). Tracing the use of evaluations in legislative processes in Swiss cantonal parliaments, 
Evaluation and Program Planning, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.evalprogplan.2016.09.007 
Eberli, D., & Bundi, P. (2017). Parlament und Evaluation: Guts Meets Brain, in Sager, Fritz, Thomas 
Widmer, & Andreas Balthasar (eds.). Evaluation im politischen System der Schweiz. Zürich: NZZ Libro, 
pp.243-278. 
Fischer, Frank, & Forester, John eds. (1993). The argumentative turn in policy analysis and planning. 
Durham NC: Duke University Press. 
Fischer, Frank, & Gottweis, Herbert eds. (2012). The Argumentative Turn Revisited: Public Policy as 
Communicative Practice: Duke University Press. 
Fischer, Frank. (2009). Democracy and expertise. Reorienting policy inquiry. Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press. 
Frey, K., & Ledermann, S. (2010). Evidence-Based Policy: A Concept in Geographical and Substantive 
Expansion. German Policy Studies 6(2), 1–15. 
10 
 
Frey, Kathrin. (2012). Evidenzbasierte Politikformuierung in der Schweiz. Gesetzesrevisionen im 
Vergleich. Baden-Baden: Nomos. 
Habermas, Jürgen. (1968 ). Technik und Wissenschaft als "Ideologie". Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 
Verlag. 
Habermas, Jürgen. (1996). Drei normative Modell der Demokratie. In: Habermas, Jürgen. (1996). Die 
Einbeziehung des Anderen. Studien zur politischen Theorie. Suhrkamp: Frankfurt/Main (pp. 277-292). 
Harsin, J. (2015), Regimes of Posttruth, Postpolitics, and Attention Economies. Communication, Cul-
ture & Critique 8, 327. 
House, Ernest R, & Howe, Kenneth R. (2003). Deliberative democratic evaluation International hand-
book of educational evaluation (pp. 79-100): Springer. 
House, Ernest, & Howe, Kenneth R. (1999). Values in evaluation and social research: Thousand Oaks, 
CA: Sage. 
Howlett, Michael. (2009). Policy analytical capacity and evidence-based policy-making: Lessons from 
Canada. Canadian public administration, 52(2), 153-175.  
Hurni, Pascal Y. (2014). Die deutsche Verwaltungswissenschaft und der Ideenimport aus den USA. 
Über den Einfluss der USA auf die Entwicklung der deutschen Verwaltungswissenschaftstradition 
während des Deutschen Reichs, der Weimarer Republik, der Zeit des Nationalsozialismus und der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland von 1870-1970. Bern: PhD thesis University of Bern. 
Lindblom, Charles E. (1959). The science of "muddling through". Public administration review, 19(2), 
79-88.  
Majone, Giandomenico. (1989). Evidence, Argument, and Persuasion in the Policy Process. New Ha-
ven: Yale University Press. 
Marra M. (2017). The ambiguities of performance-based governance reforms in Italy: Reviving the 
fortunes of evaluation and performance measurement, Evaluation and Program Planning, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.evalprogplan.2017.02.006 
Mavrot, C., & Sager, F. (2016). Vertical epistemic communities in multilevel governance. Policy & Poli-
tics: early online. 
Morris, M., & Clark, B. (2013). You want me to do WHAT? Evaluators and the pressure to misrepre-
sent findings. American Journal of Evaluation, 34(1), 57–70.  
Njalsson Gunnar K.A. (2005) From autonomous to socially conceived technology: Toward a causal, 
intentional and systematic analysis of interests and elites in public technology policy. Theoria: A jour-
nal of political theory 5: 56-81. 
Nutley, S., Walter, I., & Davies, H. T. O. (2003). From knowing to doing: A framework for understand-
ing the evidence-into-practice agenda. Evaluation, 9, 125–148. 
Overeem, P. (2010). The politics-administration dichotomy: A reconstruction. Ridderkerk: Ridder-
print. 
11 
 
Patton, Michael Quinn. (1997). Utilization-focused Evaluation: The New Century Text. Thousand 
Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Patton, Michael Quinn. (2002). A vision of evaluation that strengthens democracy. Evaluation, 8(1), 
125-139. 
Pawson Ray (2006). Evidence-Based Policy. A Realist Perspective. London: Sage. 
Pelizzo, R. and R. Stapenhurst. 2012. Parliamentary oversight tools: An comparative analysis.  London 
and New York: Routlegde. 
Pleger L., F. Sager (2017). Betterment, undermining, support and distortion: A heuristic model for the 
analysis of pressure on evaluators, Evaluation and Program Planning, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.evalprogplan.2016.09.002 
Pleger, L., & Sager, F. (2016). ‘Don’t tell me cause it hurts’ – Beeinflussung von Evaluierenden in der 
Schweiz. Zeitschrift für Evaluation, 15(1), 23–59. 
Pleger, L., Sager, F., Morris, M., Meyer, W., & Stockmann, R. (2016). Are some countries more prone 
to pressure evaluators than others? Comparing findings from the United States, United Kingdom, 
Germany, and Switzerland. American Journal of Evaluation, early online, 1098214016662907. 
Ritz, Adrian, and Fritz Sager (2010). "Outcome-based Public Management and the Balance of Powers 
in the Context of Direct Democracy", Public Administration 88(1): 120–135. 
Rosser, C., & Mavrot, C. (2016). Questioning the constitutional order—A comparison of the French 
and the US politics–administration dichotomy controversies after World War II. The American Review 
of Public Administration, early online, 1-21. 
Sager, Fritz (2007). "Habermas' Models of Decisionism, Technocracy, and Pragmatism in Times of 
Governance. The Relationship of Public Administration, Politics, and Science in the Alcohol Preven-
tion Policies of the Swiss Member States", Public Administration 85(2): 429-447. 
Sager, F., & Rosser, C. (2009). Weber, Wilson, and Hegel’s theory of modern bureaucracy. Public Ad-
ministration Review, 69(6), 1136-1147.  
Sager, Fritz, Adrian Ritz, and Kristina Bussmann (2010). "Utilization-Focused Performance Reporting. 
A Three-Step Model for the Development of Matching Goals and Indicators", Public Money & Man-
agement 30(1): 55-62. 
Sager, Fritz, & Marc Bühlmann (2009). "Checks and Balances in Swiss Direct Democracy”, in Maija 
Setälä and Theo Schiller (Eds). Referendums and Representative Democracy. London and New York: 
Routledge/ECPR Studies: pp. 186-206. 
Sager, Fritz, Thomas Widmer, & Andreas Balthasar (eds.) (2017). Evaluation im politischen System 
der Schweiz. Zürich: NZZ Verlag. 
Sager Fritz, Karin Ingold und Andreas Balthasar (2017). Policy-Analyse in der Schweiz. 
Besonderheiten, Theorien, Beispiele. Zürich: NZZ Verlag. 
12 
 
Saretzki, Thomas. (2012). The "argumentative turn" revisited: Demokratisierung von Policy-Analysen 
in partizipativen Projekten und diskursiven Designs?  in Regieren. eds. Björn Egner et al., (pp. 57-74) 
Wiesbaden: Springer VS. 
Schlaufer C. (2017). The contribution of evaluations to the discourse quality of newspaper content, 
Evaluation and Program Planning, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.evalprogplan.2016.09.006 
Schlaufer C. 2016a. "The narrative uses of evidence." Policy Studies Journal Advance online publica-
tion. doi: 10.1111/psj.12174. 
Schlaufer C. 2016b. "Global evidence in local debates: the Programme for International Student As-
sessment (PISA) in Swiss direct-democratic debates on school policy." Policy & Politics 44 (4):547-
561.  
Simons, Helen (2004) Utilizing Evaluation Evidence to Enhance Professional Practice, Evaluation 
10(4): 410-429. 
Smyth William Henry. (1919) 'Technocracy' - Ways and means to Gain Industrial Democracy. Indus-
trial Management 5: 385-389. 
Smyth William Henry. (1921) Technocracy. First, Second and Third Series. Social Universals, Berkeley: 
W. H. Smyth. 
Speer, S., Pattyn, V. and B. De Peuter. 2015. “The growing role of evaluation in parliaments: Holding 
governments accountable. “ International Review of Administrative Sciences 81(1): 37–57. 
Stockmann, R., Meyer, W., & Schenke, H. (2011). Unabhängigkeit von Evaluationen. Zeitschrift für 
Evaluation, 10(1), 17–38. 
Stucki I. (2017), Evidence-based arguments in direct democracy: The case of smoking bans in Switzer-
land, Evaluation and Program Planning, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.evalprogplan.2016.08.019 
Stucki, Iris 2016b. "The use of evidence in public debates in the media: the case of Swiss direct-demo-
cratic campaigns in the health policy sector." Evidence and Policy, 12(4): 487-504.  
Stucki, Iris. 2016a. "Arguing about smoking bans: the role of evidence in the social construction of 
conflicting policy ideas." Critical Policy Studies Advance online publication. 
Svara, J. H. (2001), The Myth of the Dichotomy: Complementarity of Politics and Administration in 
the Past and Future of Public Administration. Public Administration Review, 61: 176–183. 
The LSE GV314 Group (2013). Evaluation under contract: Government pressure and the production of 
policy research. Public Administration, 92(1), 224–239. 
Valovirta, Ville. (2002). Evaluation Utilization as Argumentation. Evaluation, 8(1), 60-80.  
Weber, M. (1980). Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft: Grundriss der verstehenden Soziologie. Tübingen: J. 
C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). 
Weiss, C. H. 1989. “Congressional committees as users of analysis.” Journal of Policy Analysis and 
Management 8(3): 411–431. 
13 
 
Weiss, C. H. 1998. “Have we learned anything new about the use of evaluation?” American Journal of 
Evaluation 19(1): 21–33. 
Weiss, C. H., & M. J. Bucuvalas. 1980. “Truth tests and utility tests: Decision-makers’ frames of refer-
ence for social science research.” American Sociological Review 45(3): 302-313. 
Whiteman, D. 1985. “The fate of policy analysis in congressional decision making: Three types of 
use.” Political Research Quarterly 38(2): 294–311. 
Widmer, Thomas (2009) The contribution of evidence-based policy to the output-oriented legitimacy 
of the state, Evidence & Policy: A Journal of Research, Debate and Practice 5(4): 351-372. 
Wildavsky, Aaron B. (1979). Speaking truth to power: Boston: Little, Brown & Co.. 
Wilson, W., T. (1887). The study of administration. Political Science Quarterly, 2(2), 197-222. 
 
